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Abstract
Under the political theory of the liberal state, there is no adequate traditional justification for contracts of
adhesion. Professor Macneil seeks to locate their legitimacy in the nature of modern bureaucracy. He
demonstrates how this mode of legitimation sets limits for government intervention. In his conclusion,
Professor Macneil emphasizes the significance of his analysis for a fuller understanding of the validity and the
complex operation of contracts of adhesion.
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BUREAUCRACY AND CONTRACTS OF
ADHESION*
By IAN R. MACNEIL**
Under the political theory of the liberal state, there is no adequate traditional
justification for contracts of adhesion. Professor Macneil seeks to locate their
legitimacy in the nature of modern bureaucracy. He demonstrates how this
mode of legitimation sets limits for government intervention. In his conclusion,
Professor Macneil emphasizes the significance of his analysis for a fuller under-
standing of the validity and the complex operation of contracts of adhesion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Standard form consumer contracts, or "contracts of adhesion,"
pose a very serious problem for the political theory of the liberal state.
In that theory, only two justifications exist for applying rules to anyone,
both founded on consent. One is individual or contractual consent,
whereby individual manifestation of a willingness to be bound in rela-
tively specific ways constitutes submissions to rules (sometimes hereaf-
ter called "liberal contract"). The other is collective consent, whereby
democratic state processes yield the application of rules by the
sovereign.'
Before turning to the relation between these two justifications and
contracts of adhesion, a number of the characteristics of such contracts
should be noted. Although some of their content, for example, the
goods to be taken and the price to be paid, is usually known to the
consumer to some degree when the contract is made, many of the terms
in the documents are not. In short, consumers do not read long docu-
ments. They do not, therefore, consent in the sense of understanding
that to which they are consenting. Moreover, no one can honestly say
that consumers ought to read long documents of this kind. The many
0 Copyright, 1984, Ian R. Macneil.
* James L. Lewtas Lecture on Commercial Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, October 13, 1983.
Except as noted the text has been kept close to the lecture as given; footnotes are added. I should like
to express my appreciation for comments received after the lecture at Osgoode and at the Faculty of
Law, University of Windsor, where an earlier version was presented, and from Roderick Macneil.
**John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
' To the extent that other justifications for the liberal state are asserted, the argument in this
article may not apply. Not only, however, does this duality seem to capture the essence of most
liberal justifications, but it is the presupposition underlying the most recent examination of the
theory of adhesion contracts; see Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion An Essay in Reconstruction
(1983), 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174. As well as the key earlier works, Professor Rakoff treats those of
Llewellyn, Kessler, Leff, and Slawson. See id. for citations to these works.
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courts which over the years have casually or not so casually said that
ignore the fact that if consumers actually did such a foolish thing the
modem economy would come to a screeching halt.
The delightful case of McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne Ltd.,2 is
illustrative. It involved the shipment of a car via the only boat line
serving the island of Islay in Scotland. As Mr. McCutcheon said of the
twenty-seven paragraphs of conditions in MacBrayne's shipping docu-
ments, "Och well, the reading and understanding would be taking half
a day, and then we would be missing the boat altogether." 3 Extrapolat-
ing from a small Hebridean island to the larger world, imagine the
disaster at the Toronto airport, even on a slow day, if each customer
insisted on reading - or worse, reading and understanding - all the
terms on which the ticket is offered by the airline. These are not, of
course, just the relatively few words that can be crammed on the ticket
itself, but the whole body of bureaucratic regulation incorporated by
reference and considered essential to the management of relations be-
tween a bureaucratic airline and its customers. Obviously, any court
saying that consumers "ought" to read the terms of long contracts of
adhesion can only be making a very poor joke.
Nevertheless, in McCutcheon, Lord Devlin accepted - pensively,
but without serious question - that had the shipping documents been
signed or read, McCutcheon would have been stuck with the twenty-
seven paragraphs of small print. This was so even though Lord Devlin
clearly believed that no one in his right mind would read those
paragraphs. Yet the fundamental idea of liberal contract is not just to
choose to be bound in some undefined way, but to choose with some
degree of precision how and to what one is bound, or at least to be
2 [1964] 1 All E.R. 430, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 125, [1964] Scots L.T.R. 66.
' There is some poetic license in this "quotation." It is a vernacular synopsis of Lord Devlin's
account:
The appellant, Mr. McCutcheon, described the negotiations which preceded the making of
this formidable contract in the following terms:
"Q. Tell us about that document; how did you come to sign it? A. You just walk in the office
and the document is filled up ready and all you have to do is sign your name and go out. Q. Did
you ever read the conditions? A. No. Q. Did you know what was in them? A. No."
There are many other passages in which Mr. McCutcheon and his brother-in-law, Mr. Mc-
Sporran, endeavour more or less successfully to appease the forensic astonishment aroused by this
statement. People shipping calves, Mr. McCutcheon said (he was dealing with an occasion when
he had shipped 36 calves), had not much time to give to the reading. Asked to deal with another
occasion when he was unhampered by livestock, he said that people generally just tried to be in
time for the boat's sailing; it would, he thought, take half a day to read and understand the
conditions and then he would miss the boat. In another part of his evidenci he went so far as to
say that if everybody took time to read the document, "MacBrayne's office would be packed out
the door." Mr. McSporran evidently thought the whole matter rather academic because, as he
pointed out, there was no other way to send a car. Supra note 2 at 435-36 (All E.R.), 132
(W.L.R.), 69 (Scots L.T.R.).
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reasonably able to do so. Thus the liberal requirement of consent to
those terms is far from met in McCutcheon, even if the documents had
been signed or read.
Nor would collective democratic consent have justified binding
McCutcheon to the unknown world of those twenty-seven paragraphs.
It is true that MacBrayne is a socialist enterprise owned by the State.
Hence MacBrayne might have asserted that the islanders, through
their voice in Parliamentary elections, consented to anything Parlia-
ment allowed its creature, MacBrayne, to put in its shipping document.
But MacBrayne has never had the nerve to take this position. It con-
cedes that its relations with customers are of a private, contractual na-
ture.5 Indeed, one of the ironies of life for those dependent on Mac-
Brayne is that its behaviour is indistinguishable from that of any
capitalist monopoly. I daresay many people would say the same of Air
Canada.
Thus it appears that neither branch of liberal legitimation justifies
binding consumers to the small print of long adhesion contracts. This
appears to force a choice between the only two possible legal results
consistent with liberal legitimation. One is that the legal system ignores
liberal theory and goes ahead anyway, sticking the consumer with un-
known terms, subject to such limiting doctrines as substantive uncon-
4 In an important recent article, supra note I at 1177, Professor Rakoff limits contracts of
adhesion to the following "model":
(1) Printed form with many terms purporting to be a contract.
(2) Form drafted by or for one party.
(3) Form user routinely enters numerous transactions of type represented by form.
(4) Except for a few identified terms, e.g., price, form presented on take-it-or-leave-it
basis, explicitly or implicitly.
(5) Adherent signs the document.
(6) Adherent enters few transactions of type represented by form, at least compared to
form user.
(7) Principle obligation of adherent "in the transaction considered as a whole" is the
payment of money.
The keystone of Professor Rakoff's model contract of adhesion is the fourth characteristic,
that of take-it-or-leave-it; characteristics (1) - (3) and (6) are simply factors leading to the form
user's being able to adopt a take-it-or-leave-it position. Characteristic (5) is a mere matter of
form, and there is no hint in any of Professor Rakoff's discussion that it is important. Characteris-
tic (7), a highly problematic one, is discussed, infra note 30.
Professor Rakoff's model omits, among other things, the absence of reading and of under-
standing as essential elements. This is so not because he believes that reading and understanding
usually occur, but because their absence is not essential to the points he makes. These absences
are "simply normal concomitants of the use in our type of society of contracts of adhesion as
defined by the model stipulated above." Id. at 1179-80. The occurrence of reading and under-
standing do not eliminate the problems he sees with enforcing adhesion terms.
5 "The drafting party neither holds nor conceives of itself as holding a distinctively public
office." Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1212-13. As will be seen, I believe that all bureaucracies, public
and private, do in fact and law hold distinctively public offics conferred on them by society and
its formal manifestation, the State.
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scionability, fairness, etc., as the court sees fit to use.' If this illiberal
route is not followed, the only alternative - under the two liberal legit-
imations discussed earlier - appears to be to erase MacBrayne's
twenty-seven paragraphs. But someone must supply the terms gov-
erning whatever subjects those paragraphs covered when they came
into issue. In liberal theory that someone can only be the state - the
legislature, the administrators, the courts, or some combination.
There is, however, an alternative analysis both solving the problem
of legitimation and focusing on the really important questions in con-
tracts of adhesion. That analysis starts with the idea of bureaucracy
and, in particular, three aspects of modern bureaucracy: the nature of
modern bureaucratic organizations, the bureaucratic effect of modern
goods and services, and consumers as bureaucratic functionaries. Fol-
lowing a discussion of these, I shall explore their relationship to con-
tracts of adhesion and liberal theory.
II. BUREAUCRACY
A. Nature of Bureaucracy7
Bureaucracy, as the term is used here, is a particular form of gov-
ernance of human affairs dominated by reasoned and detailed plan-
ning.8 A bureaucrat is anyone participating in the affairs so governed.
It may be noted that bureaucrats thus defined are a far larger class
than the term commonly implies. The word usually evokes images of
paper-shuffiers. But here it includes the bulldozer operator, the
plumber, and the carpenter just as much as it does the construction
supervisor and the architectural engineer and the lawyers who put to-
gether the construction contract and the city planners approving the
construction and the wheeler-dealers, public officials, and elected politi-
cians who filled up at the public trough to finance the project. Above
Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 601, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400
(C.A.), a Llewellynesque case, is an example of this very common North American approach,
which is treated by Professor Rakoff, supra note 1 at 1190-97.
1 This section has been revised since the Lewtas lecture; it is now essentially the same as the
revision of a similar section in another lecture, America, Bureaucracy, and the Legal Profession,
forthcoming.
' Reasoned and detailed planning of human affairs by non-bureaucratic governance is also
possible.
It is a safe bet that a sizeable part of any audience thinks of bureaucracy mainly in terms of
public bureaucracy, and that some think of it mainly pejoratively, in terms of bad public bureau-
cracy. Most emphatically I have neither such limitation in mind. I mean no less than any bureau-
cracy, private as well as public - whatever that distinction means, (see The Public/Private Dis-
tinction (1982), 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1289 et seq.) and good as well as bad - however you measure
goodness and badness.
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all, the term "bureaucrat" encompasses everyone as consumers. We are
all bureaucrats most, if not all, of the time.
Bureaucracy refers both to a generic form of governance - a con-
cept - and to any particular bureaucratic organization. Thus the To-
ronto-Dominion Bank is a bureaucracy, York University is a bureau-
cracy, Osgoode Hall Law School is a bureaucracy, Ontario Hydro is a
bureaucracy and Parliament is a bureaucracy. All of Canada is a bu-
reaucracy - an immensely complex one, of course, and the whole
world economy is an even more complex bureaucracy. These usages -
the general concept and the particular application - reflect the inter-
linked nature of bureaucracy in a world in which it is the overwhelm-
ingly dominant form of social organization.9 Turning now to that form,
we can see what factors differentiate modern bureaucratic organiza-
tions from other forms of human governance.10
The characteristics of a modern bureaucratic organization may be
summarized by seven salient features: Interconnections and boundaries;
purposes and goals; specialization and fragmentation; planning; control;
individual duties and rights; external bureaucratic effect.,'
1. Interconnections and boundaries
Bureaucratic organizations are always interconnected with other
bureaucratic organizations and with people, thus forming part of an
9 It was not always thus. The medieval church, for example, was a relatively advanced bu-
reaucracy at a time when many of those with whom it interacted were not otherwise governed
very bureaucratically. Similarly, the early railroads were even more advanced bureaucracies when
most of their customers were heavily bureaucratic only in dealing with railroads and a few others,
such as government.
10 As will be seen, each element of bureaucracy as here defined is as old as man himself,
although they all took quantum leaps in pervasiveness with the agricultural revolution and the
development of civilizations. What this Article is treating is, in essence, the consequences of more
quantum leaps resulting from the age of "enlightenment," the industrial revolution, and all their
accompaniments and aftermaths. We are thus not strictly speaking of bureaucratic and non-bu-
reaucratic, but of relative levels of bureaucracy.
" The following discussion is much influenced by Max Weber and Herbert Simon. But mod-
em bureaucracy is obviously different from prototypical Weberian bureaucracy, and modern bu-
reaucrats are often different from prototypical Weberian bureaucrats. Weber viewed bureaucrats
largely as those who are basically full time specialists internal to the organization. As a descrip-
tion of early Prussian bureaucracy this may have been a useful limitation, but certainly its nar-
rowness obscures our vision of Weber's time, and even more so of our own. In today's
bureaucraticized world everyone, like it or not, is a bureaucrat virtually all the time. But except as
employees and, for many, as TV watchers, we seldom act "full time" in any particular specialty,
but engage in countless part time bureaucratic specialties, e.g., driving our cars, shopping in su-
permarkets, listening to our stereos, using our refrigerators, staying in Holiday Inns, being hospi-
tal patients, etc. While the part time character of most of our bureaucratic activites most certainly
affects the nature of our bureaucratic roles, it makes them no less bureaucratic as the term is used
in this paper.
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ever changing relational configuration. 12 Because of this intercon-
nectedness it is, strictly speaking, inaccurate to refer to anything less
than the entire world economy as "a bureaucratic organization." Any-
thing less than that, such as York University or Canada, is always only
a part of a larger bureaucratic organization. Looking in the opposite
direction, we cannot separate individual people from any part of a bu-
reaucratic organization with which they have ties sufficiently close to
interest us. The interconnectedness of all parts of the bureaucratic
structure with other parts and with the lives of people does not and
cannot produce some kind of melded Universal Mind and Purpose. Peo-
ple remain people, and parts of the worldwide bureaucratic organiza-
tion remain separated parts or centres within the overall organization. 8
Because of this, it is convenient to speak of parts of the worldwide bu-
reaucracy as if they were separate bureaucratic organizations. 4
Because of the combination of separateness and interconnected-
ness, bureaucratic organizations have internal and external boundaries.
External boundaries separate their goals, their people, and their things
from other goals, other people, and other things. Although the nature
of the external boundaries takes many forms, such as those established
by General Motors' property rights and by the legal rights of its credi-
tors, some forms of external boundaries are always present.
As soon as bureaucratic organizations are recognized to be com-
posed of separate but interconnected centres, 5 the idea of internality
arises. Some goals, things, organizational sub-centres, people, are now
thought of as being inside the organization. Because of this, internal
boundaries are generated which separate the goals and things of the
bureaucratic organization from the goals and things of organizational
sub-centres and, most importantly, of the organization's own people.10
11 Roderick Macneil's phrase, letter to author (October 17, 1983). In terms of relational
contract theory, bureaucracies are a species of contractual relation. See I. Macneil, Values In
Contract: Internal and External (1983), 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 340.
13 The idea of a single worldwide bureaucracy is consistent with, but does not depend upon,
Wallerstein's ideas of the world economy. See Wallerstein, The Rise and Future Demise of the
World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis (1974), 16 Comp. Stud. in Soc. &
Hist. 387. Acceptance of the existence of a single worldwide bureaucratic organization is not
essential to acceptance of the propositions in this Article. Recognition of the United States or
Canada as single complex bureaucratic organizations will suffice.
14 It is, of course, also very dangerous. This is particularly so when we reify parts of the
organization - as we always do to some degree - into names such as Apple, The Canadian
Navy, and The University, because it is very easy to forget their intense inter-connectedness with
other organizations.
11 It matters not whether they are identified as bureaucratic organizations or only parts of a
larger bureaucratic organization.
16 Boundaries between subentres of bureaucratic organizations may be external for both
parts; for example, a law faculty and a faculty of arts and science in the same university. Or,
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Both internal and external boundaries are, inter alia, physical,
psychological, social and legal. Because of interconnectedness, both
kinds are also permeable, and somewhat artificial. Consider, for exam-
ple, the idea of "company time." When an employee checks into work,
his time until he checks out is owned by the company. But there is no
way that his time can cease to be his time as well as the company's, no
way in which his time can be so separated from his psyche that it be-
comes company time and only company time. This permeability also
exists in the external boundaries between centres in larger bureaucratic
organizations; witness, for example, the constant flow of personnel be-
tween regulatory agencies and their regulatees.17
2. Purposes and goals
The bureaucratic organization has purposes and goals. For exam-
ple, the purposes of Osgoode Hall Law School are teaching, research,
and public service. But all those connected with the organization also
have their own purposes and goals. These are never more than partially
in accord with those of the organization. The divergence is extremely
important, because the permeability of the boundaries between the or-
ganization and the individuals makes complete separation of organiza-
tional goals from individual goals impossible. Inevitably, the individuals
will do a great deal to manipulate the organization in order to achieve
their own goals rather than the putative goals of the organization. To
put it another way, in varying degrees every person - however mighty
or lowly - in the bureaucratic organization captures it and turns it to
his own purposes.
3. Specialization and fragmentation
Both the people and the things in the organization are highly spe-
cialized - the people in training, skills, and activities, even states of
mind - the things in function, structure, appearance. This specializa-
tion both reflects and causes the highly specialized work product of any
modern bureaucracy; law offices are not hospitals, automobile plants
are not professional football stadiums. But those are gross categories
boundaries may be external for one and internal for another; for example, the boundary between a
law faculty and its university is external for the law faculty and internal for the university. For
most if not all of the purposes of this Article, the important fact is the existence of boundaries, not
whether they are internal or external.
17 It may be noted that the sentence in the text is phrased in terms of a single bureaucratic
organization comprising the regulated and the regulator. The example refers to the United States
experience; perhaps Canada is blessedly backward on this score.
1984]
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and hardly capture the picture; it would be better to say neurologists
are not neurosurgeons, transmission mechanics don't do mufflers, and
running backs, at least in American football, do not throw forward
passes, or when they do it is considered some kind of minor miracle
when one is completed.18 Specialization has been intensifying for a
thousand years or more in the western world, and continues to increase
today, apparently at an ever increasing rate.
With specialization inevitably comes fragmentation, specialization
itself being a fragmentation of effort. But the fragmentation of effort
causes fragmentation of other kinds. Among these are fragmentation of
organization, of roles, of social solidarity, of interest, of outlook, and of
personality.
4. Planning
Partly because of specialization and fragmentation, and partly for
other reasons - such as technological demands per se and the living
dynamic of bureaucracy itself - everything about the bureaucratic or-
ganization tends to be highly planned.
a) Goals and purposes
Planning covers not only overall goals and purposes but also very
specific subjects, such as the specific work product itself. A look at the
shelves of any supermarket, or even more, the display windows of Ra-
dio Shack, will demonstrate the latter point.
b) Structures and operations
Next, the means by which goals and purposes are achieved -the
operations and the connections between operations - are highly
planned. The automobile assembly line epitomizes both the result of
such planning and this phenomenon itself.
c) Roles
Roles are also heavily planned. This planning is encompassed in
the very names of jobs: word processor operator, lathe operator, ac-
countant, electrician, electronic assembler (with countless gradations),
etc.
5. Control
a) Supervision
Since accomplishment of organizational goals requires that plans
actually be carried out, performance of tasks pursuant to the plans is
18 I think; I have watched little football for a long time, and even when I watched it was not
with what might be called a high degree of sophistication.
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normally supervised to assure compliance with them.
b) Coercion
Supervision implies the right to use coercion, the nature and limits
of which are themselves typically planned and also subject to super-
vision.
c) Techniques
Modern bureaucracies use two fundamental techniques to control
behaviour. One is the use of a wide range of communication media,
especially documentary but increasingly electronic. The second is the
use of forms of capital the bureaucracy acquires or produces. All of us
are familiar with both techniques, but the importance of the form of
capital itself as a means of bureaucratic control is rarely expressly rec-
ognized. And yet it is the most effective of all. A building, an assembly
line, an airplane, a typewriter, a word processor, a highway, a bulldozer
- all of these and infinitely many more specific forms of capital are
among the most effective techniques bureaucracies have to control be-
haviour of their bureaucrats. Unlike other forms of communication, in
large measure capital not only communicates, but, as will be seen,19
carries its own coercion right along with it. Thus, the greatest law mak-
ers and law enforcers in the world today are not people, but products.
d) Vertical and horizontal
Control in a bureaucracy is exercised both hierarchically, between
numerous levels of authority, and horizontally, through co-ordination
and co-operation among relative equals. Formal control is typically hi-
erarchical, as is true of much informal control. On the other hand, a
great deal of informal control is either horizontal among equals or self-
imposed. These dual characteristics of vertical and horizontal control
permeate all aspects of the activities of the organization.
6. Individual rights and duties
The effect of individuals' having planned and supervised roles, sub-
ject to limited organizational rights to coerce, is the creation of individ-
ual duties and rights, with correlative rights and duties of the
organization.
7. External bureaucratic effect
The bureaucratic patterns just described are not limited to the in-
ternal conduct of the organization. The only way in which a bureau-
cratic organization can deal with persons and things seemingly outside
'9 See text, infra at notes 20-23.
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its boundaries is bureaucratically. A bureaucracy is as incapable of
nonbureaucratic behaviour in relation to outsiders as it is to insiders; it
thus imposes bureaucratic patterns on anyone dealing with it, irrespec-
tive of why they are dealing with it.
B. Bureaucratic Effect of Modern Goods and Services
Goods and services have always had effect on the lives of their
users beyond the obvious ones relating to their main purposes.20 The
introduction of the heavy plow in medieval Europe, for example, did
not simply increase the quantity of crops produced in heavy soils. It
also caused major changes in organization of work, in land use, in land
ownership, and in the social structure. Modern goods and services are
no exception, and it should come as no surprise that bureaucratically
planned and produced goods and services cause bureaucratic behaviour
among their users. It was this phenomenon to which I referred when I
said that use of particular forms of capital is one of the two chief tech-
niques of bureaucratic control.
It may help to refer to a specific example and its relation to three
key elements of bureaucratic behaviour: specialization, planning, and
control. It is an appropriate one since the Maple Leafs had their open-
ing home game just last night. 1 It is the Zamboni, the machine used to
smooth ice rinks. The Zamboni is, of course, a highly specialized prod-
uct, virtually useless for anything except one narrow function. I sup-
pose in a pinch it could be used for a bathtub, but any use other than
smoothing ice rinks is extremely marginal.2 When whoever makes
such decisions for Maple Leaf Gardens elects to buy a Zamboni, its
very presence at the rink constitutes detailed planning of the behaviour
of Gardens employees. Both what it will do and what it will not do
governs their behaviour. An employee will drive it, not pick it up and
use it like a shovel or a mop - and not just drive it, but drive it the
way a Zamboni has to be driven, which is quite different from driving a
sports car or a big rig or a forklift. Moreover, the workable speed of the
Zamboni effectively plans when it will be used. Unlike mechanisms
available before its invention, it is fast enough to do a whole rink be-
tween periods of a hockey game. But it is not fast enough to smooth the
20 The comments, supra note 10, that man has always been bureaucratic also pertain to the
bureaucratic effect of goods, even of the most simple kind.
11 October 12, 1983; the Leafs tied.
2 After I gave the Lewtas lecture I was told that the Toronto Blue Jays had recently used a
Zamboni to pick up water from their baseball field. Even the most specialized equipment can
always be found to have some other uses!
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rink during a timeout. Thus it will be used between periods, but not at
timeouts. Nor is the Zamboni agile enough to get in and around hockey
goals; thus its operation plans the activities of at least a couple of other
employees who must remove the goals and the pins holding them in
place and return them after the Zamboni has done its job. Undoubt-
edly, a Zamboni expert could say much more along these lines, but
what has been said is enough to illustrate the point.
We look at capital like Zambonis, computers, buildings, washing
machines, etc., as objects to produce goods or services we find of value.
And so they are. But so mesmerized are we with this view that we
forget that they are also means of planning and its communication, and
not just communication, but command, and not just command but en-
forcing command. It is virtually impossible to over-emphasize this
point. Not only is a Zamboni a planner, a communicator, a com-
mander, and an enforcer, all rolled into one complex object, but it is
incredibly efficient on all those scores. Once it is acquired and an em-
ployee is trained to operate it and told when the rink should be
smoothed, the planning, communicating, commanding, and most of the
enforcing is virtually self-executing. In short, a Zamboni is a miniature
bureaucracy all in itself, and an exceptionally effective one.
Obviously, the forms capital takes will vary greatly in their capac-
ity to perform these bureaucratic functions. Relatively simple tools like
hammers perform such functions in very limited, although real, ways;
complex tools like petrochemical plants in very extensive ways. The
Zamboni is somewhere in a vast middle on this score. But few, if any,
of the tangible things belonging to bureaucratic organizations lack this
capacity altogether. This fact is closely connected with the third subject
to be mentioned before dealing directly with the question of legitima-
tion of adhesion contracts.
C. Consumers in the Role of Bureaucratic Functionaries.
Consumers are bureaucratic functionaries in many ways. For ex-
ample, every time a person goes into a supermarket, takes goods off the
shelves, puts them into the cart, takes them to the checkout counter,
removes them, and keeps an eye on the cash register, that person is
performing bureaucratic tasks which a generation or two ago were per-
formed only by employees of the store. That the customer - a part-
timer - is doing it rather than the sales clerks - full-timers - alters
not in the slightest the bureaucratic nature of these functions or that
they are part and parcel of the customer's work for the store.
This particular consumer participation in the bureaucracy of the
supermarket occurs before the goods of the bureaucratic supermarket
1984]
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cross over its external legal boundary and become the consumer's
goods. In other instances - for example, the treatment of a patient in
a hospital - the consumer's participation in the bureaucracy occurs
contemporaneously with acquisition of the services. In others it comes
after acquisition of goods. But the consumer's acting as a bureaucratic
functionary is by no means dependent on the point at which he acquires
ownership of the product. Indeed, the time of acquisition is largely ir-
relevant in terms of understanding how the consumer becomes a bu-
reaucrat. What is relevant is that the goods and services supplied to
consumers exercise bureaucratic control over consumers throughout the
lives of the goods or services in question, in exactly the same way as
does the Zamboni. When a person buys a dishwasher, or a frozen din-
ner, or a TV, he has bought plans for future behaviour, communication
of those plans, commands that they be performed in certain ways, and
forms of enforcement if they are not. It is true that the commands and
their enforcement are all conditioned on the person's deciding to go
ahead and use whatever it is he has acquired. He can, after all, easily
throw the thing away.23 It is true that his continuing as a bureaucrat is
voluntary, 4 but that does not mean that he is not a bureaucrat while
he continues. He will discover this the hard way if the dishwasher is
installed improperly, or if he leaves the TV dinner unfrozen too long
before cooking and eating it, or if he sticks his finger into the back of
the TV while the interlock is connected and the set is plugged into the
electric socket.
Not only are these goods bureaucratic, but they are also, as are
most consumer goods, goods of adhesion, to use the late Arthur Left's
phrase.25 Like documentary contracts of adhesion, one's participation
in making them ranges from quite to extremely limited. Outside those
limits one takes them or leaves them. Inside those limits one's partici-
pation in making them is heavily bureaucratic.26
Services, as much or more than goods, convert consumers into part
of the bureaucratic apparat of the supplier.27 Even a simple thing like a
haircut involves the consumer in a number of bureaucratic processes.
2 Actually, even that is not always true - consider the disposal of such dangerous objects as
pressurized cans or large objects like freezers.
I It is voluntary in terms of obligations, legal, or otherwise, to the purveyor. Typically, how-
ever, the pressures leading to acquiring the goods in the first place lead to their use after
acquisition.
" Leff, Contract as a Thing (1970), 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131 at 145.
26 Of course, there are great variations: a bare canvas, miscellaneous oils, and brushes, are
obviously less bureaucratic than a paint-by-number set.
27 Services almost always involve goods, which add to the bureaucratic effect.
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More complex services, such as medical services in a hospital, often
integrate consumers into the medical bureaucracy in virtually every as-
pect of their lives, indeed far more extensively than medical personnel
themselves.
The supplying of both bureaucratic goods and bureaucratic ser-
vices is often accompanied by planning and control of the consumer by
documents (or other communication media, such as electronic types)
emanating from the bureacratic centre(s) in question. These take
countless forms, among them instructions for using goods, institutional
regulations, notices in buildings and computer programming. Very
often this documentary planning and command is just as important, in
terms of benefits the consumer seeks to acquire, as the basic good or
service in question.28 For example, resort hotels typically hand to guests
upon registration extensive descriptions of facilities, location, times of
opening, who can use them, and on what terms. Without the informa-
tion they contain, utilization of the facilities may be thwarted and a
wide range of difficulties may be encountered. These documents, which
we commonly associate with bureaucratic planning, command, and en-
forcement, 29 combine with the capital itself - restaurants, swimming
pool, sauna, tennis courts, golf course, etc. to convert the vacationer
into a bureaucrat throughout the stay - a happy one, we hope, but a
bureaucrat nonetheless.
To summarize to this point, bureaucratic patterns of behaviour are
engendered not only through words (oral or printed) and other means
of communications, legal structures, and the like, but by the use of
goods and services produced by bureaucracies. Consumers thus become
functionaries of bureaucracies both by documentary contracts and by
the processes of acquiring and using goods and services supplied by the
bureaucracies. Both goods and documents are commonly adhesive in
nature.3 °
28 In the case of some products, such as computer programming, it may be almost impossible
to distinguish the basic good from the "mere" communication.
29 The consumer may receive them earlier, when making the reservations, and in the eyes of
traditional contract law that may affect his rights, but in terms of normal functioning of the
relation it makes little difference when they are received; their final bureaucratic effect is
identical.
30 Recognition that acquisition and use of consumer goods and services are part and parcel of
the whole bureaucratic enterprise puts Professor Rakoff's definition of contracts of adhesion, supra
note 4, in a very different perspective. His limitation of the definition to instances where "[t]he
principle obligation of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a whole is the payment
of money" takes on singular importance. He included the limitation to eliminate "certain interac-
tive relationships that might also be evidenced by standard forms used on a nonnegotiable basis,
but in which the drafting party may be constrained by continual need to generate cooperation and
effort on the part of the adherent. Certain long-term business relationships and some employment
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III. LEGITIMIZING CONTRACTS OF ADHESION31
But what does this have to do with MacBrayne's shipping docu-
ments and their twenty-seven paragraphs of small print? First, it may
be noted that in our economy the idea of the consumer's being commit-
ted by consent to the unknown or to take-it-or-leave-it propositions is
hardly peculiar to documents. Whenever a consumer buys any bureau-
contracts fall within this excluded category." Rakoff, supra note I, at 1178. (Emphasis added.)
(The modifier "some" in reference to employment contracts is strange, as is a footnote reference
describing a franchise as a "borderline case of a contract of adhesion." Under both the limitation
set out in the definition and the reason given for the limitation, all employment contracts and all
franchises would be excluded. Some unexpressed agenda seems to underlie Professor Rakofi's
thinking on this point.)
If use of goods and services is an essential part of the bureaucratic enterprise of supplying
consumer goods and services, then bureaucratic purveyors in all consumer transactions have a
"continual need to generate cooperation and effort on the part of the adherent." And use Is an
essential part, for without it the entire producer-consumer structure would fall apart, since no one
would buy anything. (It may be noted that the "need to generate co-operation and effort on the
part of the adherent" is the only specific element Professor Rakoff attributes to his "interactive
relationships.")
It follows from the foregoing that limiting the term "contracts of adhesion" to those where
"[t]he principal role of the adhering party in the transaction as a whole is the payment of money"
would leave the term applicable only to a virtually empty set in real life. Or to forget the jargon,
there are not many to be found. And, even though Professor Rakoff states his limitation not in
terms of role, but in terms of legal obligation, it is clear from examining his underlying reasons for
that limitation - quoted above - that it is role rather than presence or absence of legal obliga-
tion that really matters. The presence or absence of any legal obligation to use a consumer good
or service once acquired is entirely irrelevant to existence or nonexistence of the purveyor's need
for cooperation and effort on the part of the adherent.
If Professor Rakoff is to deal with the adhesion contracts of the real world, his definition must
be expanded. But expanding the definition to encompass contracts where the consumer (or others
fitting the rest of his definition) have roles beyond paying money would open up a Pandora's box
of troubles for his analysis, namely the whole "interactive relationship" problem he now carefully
avoids. But the troubles are there in the real world; the consumer in fact has the roles Professor
Rakoff wants to avoid considering.
It seems to me that Professor Rakoff is very much subject to the same criticism (albeit for a
different reason) he aims at Llewellyn, Leff, and Slawson: "They have not followed the practice
[of using contracts of adhesion] back to its roots in the relationships of individuals to large institu-
tions and forward into its implications for the relationship of those institutions to the social order
as a whole." Id. at 1215-16.
The foregoing should not be taken to indicate complete disagreement with Professor Rakoff's
conclusions. I think there may very well be some circumstances where one of two legislative or
judicial approaches are appropriate: (1) Professor Rakoff's presumption of unenforceability, fol-
lowed by an opportunity for the form-supplier to justify the terms affirmatively, or (2) reading the
contract as if the terms had never been inserted in the first place, thereby simply leaving gaps to
be filled in the usual way legislatures and courts fill gaps in contracts. (My own preference tends
towards the second.) As will be seen, however, my conclusions are not based on the liberal princi-
ple as Professor Rakoff appears to accept it, but on the practical matters he explores. See, for
example, his discussion of the difference between business expertise and drafting expertise, Id. at
1204-1205.
31 The word legitimize - synonymous with legitimate - is not used here in the Weberian
sense attacked in Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, [1983] Wis. L.
Rev. 379, nor in the other three senses Hyde describes as "quite common," id. at 381, n. 1, nor in
Habermas' sense, id. at 399, n. 45. Rather it is used in a fairly common lay sense of the word:
make something conform to recognized principles. In this case, the "recognized principles" are
those of the liberal state, as defined at the start of this Article.
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cratic good he is being committed by consent both to the unknown and
to take-it-or-leave-it goods. There are few, if any, bureaucratic goods
about which even the most well-informed consumer knows everything
at the time of acquisition, or indeed ever, and few, if any, offered ex-
cept on some take-it-or-leave-it terms. This similarity between goods
and services on the one hand and printed standard terms on the other
suggests either that both ways of binding consumers are legitimate or
that both are illegitimate. If bureaucratic goods are legitimate ways of
binding consumers to the unknown, why not bureaucratic documents?
If bureaucratic documents are illegitimate ways of binding consumers
because their contents are unknown, why are bureaucratic goods not
equally illegitimate on that score?3 2 But which is it, are both legitimate
or are both illegitimate?
To answer this question it is, I believe, necessary to re-explore the
fundamental liberal ideas of consent and their relation to contracts.
The beginning of this Article describes the idea of specific individual
consent - contractual consent - as separate from the idea of demo-
cratic collective consent. But these two forms of consent are intimately
connected in the world of contract, the world of exchange.
In the liberal model, contractual consent - consent to exchange
- occurs in the first place only because of the coercion made possible
by rights of property and rights of liberty. Each party to any potential
exchange starts with the right not to surrender his property and not to
surrender his liberty. Each potential party to a contract thereby has
power over the other. This makes it possible for each to coerce the
other, however much that power in each may find its justification in
concepts of individualism and rights to be let alone. Thus, the only way
a potential exchanger can secure desired property or services is to con-
31 Analyzed in Professor Rakoff's terms of "take-it-or-leave-it," supra note 4, the questions
remain fundamentally the same: if bureaucratic take-it-or-leave-it goods are legitimate ways of
binding consumers, why are not bureaucratic take-it-or-leave-it documents equally legitimate ways
of binding consumers? If take-it-or-leave-it documents are illegitimate ways of binding consumers,
why are take-it-or-leave-it goods not equally illegitimate?
It may be noted that the essence of all the characteristics in Professor Rakoff's definition of
contracts of adhesion may be restated in terms of bureaucratic goods and services:
(1) Tender of the good or service purports to be contractual, and its various standardized
parts become part of the resulting contract.
(2) Good or service is made by or for one party.
(3) Producing party routinely enters numerous transactions in this type of good or service.
(4) Good or service is, except for some dickered parts, e.g., various options, presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, explicitly or implicitly.
(5) Adherent takes the good or service.
(6) Adherent enters few acquisitions of the good or service, at least compared to the
supplier.
(7) Principle obligation of adherent "in the transaction considered as a whole is payment of
money." Problems with this characteristic are discussed, supra note 30.
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vince the other potential exchanger that it is in his interest to supply
them, to give up his property or liberty. Only one proper way exists to
do this: to offer something valued by the other party. These mutual
powers to coerce - founded on property and liberty rights - do not
themselves arise from the individual consent of these parties. Rather,
they come from society.33 In the theory of the liberal state these rights
of property and liberty are legitimized by collective consent to the exis-
tence and support of such rights, such collective consent being exer-
cised through democratic processes.
Thus we find that the idea of individual consent, upon which our
traditional notions of contract are based, is in fact set upon a founda-
tion of coercion made possible by property and liberty, which them-
selves are legitimized by collective consent. With that thought in mind
we can now return to contracts of adhesion and to the consumer as
bureaucrat.
What the consumer agrees to in purchasing a bureaucratic product
is to become a bureaucrat as defined by both the known and the un-
known natures of that product. Similarly when he accepts a product
knowing that it is accompanied by documentary terms he agrees to be-
come a bureaucrat as defined by both the known and unknown docu-
mentary terms. In principle he is no different on this score than if he
had signed up formally as an employee of the organization in question,
one whose job is to acquire and use the product in accordance with its
bureaucratic nature and with bureaucratic directions of the employer.
In the traditional contract theory described earlier, however, there
is no justification for restraining the consumer either by the unknown
nature of the product or by unknown documentary terms. In that tradi-
tional theory the only legitimate coercion comes from rights of property
or liberty coupled with specific individual consent to the making of
known changes in those rights.
There is, however, another well-established strand of contract
which has not been mentioned and which is quite, quite different. Lib-
eral society has always recognized numerous legitimate relations into
" Even if one believes that rights of property and liberty are conferred on man as a matter of
the natural law of a deus ex machina, as a practical matter rights of liberty and property come
from society, including its formal manifestation in the State. Certainly any theory traceable to an
idea of man-the-atom, whether liberal, utilitarian, or otherwise, must, to be consistent, recognize
that such rights come from society as embodied by Leviathan. It may be noted that acceptance of
this proposition reduces the public-private distinction to a level far less basic than that often ac-
corded to it. (I mention this point because Professor Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1197-1220, stresses
alleged failures of prior analyses to transcend the distinction. Private rights are, just as the Marx-
ists have always asserted, an arm of society, although, for a non-Marxist and maybe for many
Marxists these days, not necessarily an arm of a dominant class.)
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which entry is by consent, but the content of which is largely unknown
at the time the consent was given. This is the idea of joining a relation.
We can join a law firm or a university faculty or any other employment
relation; we can join the army; we can join a corporation by buying its
shares; we can join in holy matrimony. In each instance we can do so in
spite of large-scale ignorance about the restraints we are accepting. In
spite of our ignorance liberal society will bind us to those unknown
restraints. All that is required - besides our individual consent to join
- is that the kind of relation in question be one upon which the collec-
tive stamp of approval has been impressed."
At this point the reader may be forgiven for thinking that I have
been playing a shell game. Having said that liberal society has only two
bases for restraining its members, now I have introduced a third: con-
sent to join an approved relation. And so I have, but I shall not apolo-
gize. My excuse is that mainstream liberal thinking avoids the exis-
tence of relations like the plague, because the concept of relation,
particularly when it is given the common label of status, is anathema to
the individualism upon which liberalism is based. Thus, although lib-
eral societies have at operating levels always - and necessarily so -
used the consensual status route to de facto legitimation, liberal theo-
rists largely ignore such legitimation. Instead they try to squeeze legiti-
mation into one of the other two categories first mentioned. 5 Legitima-
tion by consent to relations approved by society is, whenever possible,
hidden in the liberal intellectual closet.
Now it is possible to see how contracts of adhesion are legitimized.
Contracts of adhesion are the product of two legitimations by collective
democratic processes of the modern liberal state. One of these is the
legitimation of what I shall call the consumer-mission, the mission of
seeing to it that consumers have, at relatively low prices, vast quantities
of the goods and services so dear to most of the denizens of the modem
liberal state.3a The second is the legitimation of the bureaucratic rela-
Property itself creates such relations, but without any consent (except the collective con-
sent of society) of people subject to the property rights of others.
31 Sweeping statements of this nature are probably best left undocumented and to the general
sense of approval or disapproval of the reader. If the statement is reduced to include only liberal
American analysts of adhesion contracts, reference may be made to Professor Rakoff, and those
writers discussed in his article, supra note 1.
3' The phrase "seeing to it" includes in this context seeing to it that consumers use the goods
and services, as well as that they acquire a right to use them. While widespread acquisition of
rights to use may be sufficient to achieve goals of the modem state, such as high levels of employ-
ment and apparently high levels of "standard of living," in the long run acquisition depends on
consumer perception that the goods and services can be and will be used by them in achieving
final consumption. Even conspicuousness of consumption (as a goal in itself) is largely dependent
on some form of use.
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tion per se, particularly in the service of the consumer-mission. This is,
of course, the relation of most purveyors of goods and services of adhe-
sion and suppliers of documentary contracts of adhesion. Both the con-
sumer-mission and the bureaucratic relations that encompass consum-
ers and that are required to carry out that mission are thoroughly
legitimized by the democratic processes of the liberal state. The entire
political structure, whether one views that phrase narrowly in terms of
government or more broadly to encompass, for example, corporations
and labour unions, is geared up from top to bottom to keep the cornu-
copia of bureaucratic goods and services ever-flowing. Let inflation,
business cycles, or taxation slow the flow even moderately, and govern-
ments fall like matchsticks in a hurricane. In the modern liberal state
the consumer-mission is the most legitimate of all modern activities and
bureaucracy is the most legitimate of all modern relations. Thus, of all
the statuses extolled in the modern liberal society, that of bureaucratic-
consumer is held to be. the highest of them all.37 Each enterprise sup-
plying consumer products thus has the collective approval for its pro-
ceeding bureaucratically - the only way it can - analogous to that
given property and liberty in traditional contract. Add to that the con-
sumer's consent to join any particular bureaucracy by buying its prod-
uct, and the second leg of liberal legitimation of goods and documents
of adhesion is satisfied.
IV. LIVING WITH CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
The particular principles by which a social institution is legiti-
mized has many effects, of which three need mention here."8 First, the
legitimizing principle shapes our very perceptions of the institution.
Second, the legitimizing principle sets outside limits on the feasibility
and appropriateness of legal responses to the institution.39 Third, the
11 There is no room in liberal theory for the idea of status. The statuses existent in all known
human social relations can be viewed through the lens of liberal theory only as social aberrations.
For example, quota or quota-like programs for the benefit of racial or linguistic minorities or for
the female majority, which create the status of Black, French, or Female, can be justified under
liberal theory only as most undesirable expedients (means) to achieve social conditions in which
those statuses can be abolished (ends). But the argument of expediency does not work respecting
the status of consumer-bureaucrat, because its nurturing is the end of the present liberal state.
Thus one may not expect to find in writings based on liberal theory overt recognition of a status as
an acceptable permanent condition. Overt recognition requires either abandonment of liberal the-
ory (as the term is used in this Article) or abandonment of the consumer-mission as it currently
prevails in the liberal state. The former is unattractive theoretically, the latter is impossible
politically.
" "Legitimized" continues to mean conforming to the principles of the liberal state discussed
at the beginning of the Article.
39 It has similar effects on other social responses as well; for simplicity the discussion is lim-
[VOL. 22, NO. I
Contracts of Adhesion
legitimizing principle serves as one of perhaps many guides to what the
legal responses within those limits should be.
Consider, for example, traditional contract. Our idea of the nature
of contract is so much shaped by the legitimizing principles of property,
liberty, and individual consent, that we often find it very difficult even
to think about contract in any terms other than those of a traditional
contract law founded on those principles. In addition, traditional con-
tract, because of that legitimation, leaves only limited range for inter-
fering with so-called freedom of contract.40 This is true not only in the
ideological sense, but even more so in the practical sense. History is, for
example, strewn with the wreckage of efforts, such as peacetime rent
control, where this lesson has been ignored. Finally, within the outer
limits imposed by this particular legitimation, principles of property,
liberty, and consent provide guidance for the resolution of a wide vari-
ety of conflicts. For two reasons, however, within the outer limits those
principles provide only guidance, not definite answers. First, conflicts
always exist within any legitimizing principle itself; for example, be-
tween the principle of liberty and the coercion of consent.41 Second,
there are conflicts with principles lying outside these legitimizing prin-
ciples. For example, principles of equality, which may prompt wealth
redistribution by governmental regulation, often conflict with the legiti-
mizing principles of traditional contract.
Similarly, any method of legitimizing contracts of adhesion will
shape our perceptions and will as well establish outer limits and guides
(but not clear answers) for legal intervention within the outer limits.
The traditional legitimations through consent have been found, upon
careful examination, simply not to work within the limits of liberal the-
ory.42 That leaves us with only the legitimacy suggested in this Article:
legitimacy through the consumer-mission and bureaucratic ways of ac-
complishing it. By legitimizing consumer-bureaucracies such as the
Ford Motor Company and allowing - indeed encouraging - consum-
ers to become their functionaries by purchasing their products, society
has shaped our perceptions of the relations created by goods of adhe-
sion and documentary contracts of adhesion. Our perceptions are those
of a consumer whose role in all respects, including the legal obligations
ited to legal effects.
40 I label it "so-called" not because of a distaste for it, but because freedom of contract is a
misleading term; for most purposes it is better called "power of contract."
41 This conflict, as well as the difference between choice and consent, is explored in Macneil,
supra note 12, at 356-59.
42 This is the point, insofar, as legitimation is concerned, made by Rakoff, supra note 1, as
well as by Leff and Slawson, whose work he analyzes.
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and rights attached to the role, is indistinguishable in any general sense
from that of any other bureaucrat.43 In addition, this legitimation has
created outer limits and guides to what society can and should do in
overseeing the status of consumer-bureaucrat, whether by law or other-
wise. The outer limits are ignored at the peril of either destroying Ford
or so transforming it that its consumer-mission can no longer be per-
formed. The guides are ignored at the peril of partially frustrating the
consumer-mission of producing large numbers of relatively low cost
automobiles.
V. THEMES
No exploration of these matters in any detail is feasible here. It is
feasible only to show some of the themes that must run through any
approach to contracts of adhesion which recognizes their consumer-bu-
reaucratic nature.
One theme concerns the nature of the technique available to soci-
ety when it uses sovereign law to interfere with contracts of adhesion as
developed by the consumer-bureaucracies. There is only one such tech-
nique: the sovereign has only public bureaucracies available to interfere
with contracts of adhesion." Only other bureaucracies are capable of
dealing with private bureaucracies or anything beyond a mere joining
or adhesion basis. This requires us to rephrase any noble principle of
controlling business greed, harshness, and overbearing power exercised
through contracts of adhesion. The only workable "principle" along
48 By definition, all bureaucratic roles are specialized roles; hence, the role of a consumer is
not identical to the role of an employee, but then the role of an employee is not identical to that of
a shareholder, or, for that matter, any other type of employee. Interestingly enough, particular
consumer specialities can be, and often are, far more ubiquitous than any employment specialty;
e.g., almost every Canadian and American over three or four years old is a TV-user specialist part
of the time.
44 Recognition of this fact should give pause to anyone enamored with my colleague Michael
Perry's call for the United States Supreme Court to act as a major moral voice in the society.
Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (1982). (Perhaps similar calls have gone
forth respecting the Supreme Court of Canada; whether they have or not, the new Charter of
Rights virtually begs for creation of such a role.) Morality voiced only through the bureaucratic
legal process available to the United States Supreme Court has defects and costs that Professor
Perry has not addressed. The recent action of the United States Supreme Court in requiring (as a
matter of statutory, not constitutional, right) unisex life expectancy tables for calculating retire-
ment benefits is illustrative. Arizona Governing Committee, etc. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
Presumably the Court was voicing what it would consider to be a moral view against sexism.
(Which is more sexist, unisex or sex-based tables is, however, debatable, and it is by no means
clear who makes a net gain from universal use of unisex life expectancy tables.) But the Court's
morality will most assuredly be expressed primarily through bureaucracy. As Sophie Korczyk of
the Employee Benefit Research Institute noted: "The group that everyone agrees will thrive (on
the decision] . . . is 'the benefits consultants. They will be raking in a lot of fees.'" Time, July 18,
1983, at 34.
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these lines becomes:
Our public-bureaucracy will interact with their private-bureaucracy in constantly
ongoing resolution of the conflict between their assessment of what will attract
consumers to join their bureaucracy (or at least not deter their joining) and our
public-bureaucratic assessment of what the terms of that consumer-bureaucratic
status should be.
Nobility of thought tends to disappear under such circumstances. All
too often it is replaced by the sweetheart relations typically arising be-
tween the regulated and the regulators, a major curse of the adminis-
tered capitalist state.
A second theme concerns effectiveness in accomplishing the con-
sumer-mission. By and large, the liberal states have shown very limited
interest in taking over the design, production and distribution of con-
sumer goods and services. There is a widespread view that public bu-
reaucracies cannot accomplish the consumer-mission as effectively as
can so-called private bureaucracies. 5 As long as this view prevails,
what society can or should do to interfere with the consumer-bureau-
cratic status is severely limited.48 This is true whether the bureaucra-
tization is established by goods and services themselves or by documen-
tary contracts of adhesion. The question is always: if the public
bureaucrats get in there and mess with this good of adhesion or this
contract of adhesion, can the business still deliver the goods?
A third theme concerns the vector consumer-bureaucracies take.
While the consumer-mission is largely assigned by the modern state to
private bureaucracies, there is a sharp difference between their mission
and their motives. Their mission is to produce large quantities of goods
and services at relatively low cost. Their motive is a desire to reap
profit, power, growth and internal employment.' 7 There is neither total
45 The public nature of private property and liberty, discussed, supra, text at note 33, makes
"private bureaucracies" in both fact and theory a special type of public bureaucracy. In addition,
any bureaucracy is by definition a law-maker in every sense of the word except that "private
bureaucracies" cannot through sovereign law directly invoke force and confiscation to enforce
their laws. (They can, of course, do so indirectly, by invoking property, liberty and contract
rights.) To the extent we associate law-making on a large scale with the word "public", large
"private bureaucracies" are in fact public.
46 Professor Rakoff accepts this as one of his premises as to goods and services, but not as to
documentary contracts of adhesion: "With regard to mass-produced goods, government, at least in
the absence of revolutionary economic change, must take private production for granted and adopt
a reflexive, regulatory stance; production of standardized legal terms is, by contrast, governmental
stock-in-trade." Supra note 1, at 1209-1210.
47 The last may require explanation for some readers who have no trouble accepting the first
three motives. To the extent that the "motives" of the consumer-bureaucracy are those of upper-
level management, that management is, of course, concerned about its own continued employ-
ment. In addition, wherever there is unionization, job security will be a goal of the union, and, to
the extent it has power, a goal imposed on upper-level management. And, if one is not completely
cynical about these things (and I for one am not) one may believe that many of the more powerful
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harmony nor total disharmony between mission and motive. The con-
sumer vote in the marketplace is a powerful force towards harmony of
motivation and mission, but far from all powerful. And to the extent
there is disharmony, public intervention must be considered. Consid-
ered, mind you, not automatically chosen. Before public intervention
respecting anything, including contracts of adhesion, is chosen, it is
necessary to remember that society has but one means of intervening
- public bureaucracy. Its potential effectiveness and costs in the cir-
cumstances must therefore be considered. Among the points to be rec-
ognized is that deviation between mission and motive is every bit as
serious, if not more so, in public bureaucracies as in private bureaucra-
cies. Unfortunately, the vote of the citizen in establishing the directions
of the public bureaucracies often seems pitifully weak on this score.
Thus, just as the vector of private consumer-bureaucracies may and
does veer from the consumer-mission, so too may and does the vector of
public bureaucracies veer from their legislatively assigned missions.
A fourth theme concerns competing legitimacies. The consumer-
mission is far from the only mission legitimized by the modern liberal
state. Nor, as was suggested earlier in connection with traditional con-
tract, is that mission free of its own internal conflicts. Competing legiti-
macies, including paternalistic ones adopted by collective consent, such
as wealth distribution, may give rise to legal interventions respecting
both goods of adhesion and documentary contracts of adhesion. Of
course, if pressed too far this intervention could prevent performance of
the consumer-mission. Moreover, the effectiveness of such intervention
may be limited, and no one can guarantee that the vector any public
bureaucratic tool actually takes will be the one putatively assigned to
it. But none of these potential problems will necessarily arise, and pub-
lic intervention to promote competing legitimacies is always a live
possibility.
Finally we come to a dark theme, the existence of which few like
to admit, but which is more prevalent than we like to think. This theme
is the deformed lovechild of the union of power-seeking and pure rea-
son. It has no proper place in the theories of the liberal state, but its
ubiquity in that state requires consideration in any realistic discussion.
Human beings have an inordinate love of power, of being able to move
their brethren and sistren in directions other than those in which the
siblings would otherwise go. At no time is this love more dangerous
than when it is meshed with pure reason. And of all the human social
members of consumer-bureaucracies, i.e., upper level management, mean what they say when they
take on the role of creators of jobs.
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institutions in existence, bureaucracy most exemplifies - even though
it corrupts - pure reason. Thus in any debate about the roles of either
private or public bureaucracies respecting goods of adhesion or docu-
mentary contracts of adhesion, the effects of this evil combination
must, if we wish salvation, be kept in mind.48
VI. CONCLUSION
I shall conclude by remarking on the sharp contrast between the
complexity of analysis appropriate to deal with contracts of adhesion,
and the relative simplicity of the questions raised by the traditional
contract approach to them.49 Traditional contract poses two questions:
(1) Did the person adhering consent, either by knowing the contents of
the form or because he ought to have known them? (2) Do the rights of
property and liberty extend far enough to justify giving full effect to
the consent they coerced in this situation?
In modern times, the first traditional question gives rise to an im-
mensely simple answer: consumers remain unbound by the great mass
of fine print purportedly governing their contractual relations, to say
nothing of remaining unbound by the unknown contents of the goods
they buy. MacBrayne, Air Canada, and Ford Motor beware if legisla-
tures and courts ever start being true to traditional contract principles!
The second traditional question gives rise to simple answers such as
"Yes" or those apparently somewhat more complex answers based on
principles like unconscionability and unequal bargaining power.50
These traditional questions and answers are very simple indeed
compared to the analysis required when we view contracts of adhesion
as inevitable extensions of bureaucracy, and those adhering to them as
becoming consumer-bureaucrats. Complexity is raised to a whole new
4S The editors kindly allowed this statement to remain, in spite of their distaste for its - to
their eyes - hyperbolic nature.
4 "Traditional contract approach" refers to a "pure" one based on the theory of the liberal
state described at the beginning of this article. As mentioned, supra note 6, the supposedly tradi-
tional contract approach actually applied by various courts often departs from that "pure" ap-
proach. The reader will have noted that this article is addressed to the legitimations actually or
putatively underlying law, not to the actualities of current law-in-action in North America or
elsewhere, except to suggest the bureaucratic character of that law-in-action.
Io I use the word "apparently" in the text because these doctrines can, and often do, become
not tools of analysis, but cliches to confirm gut feelings of judges and other writers. Unequal
bargaining power is one of the great mindless cliches of the day. Most often the term seems to be
a screen for avoiding facing the fact that undesired inequalities arise from the existence of prop-
erty and bureaucracy. These inequalities have little or nothing to do with bargaining or deals per
se, and trying to redress them by focusing on contract rather than on property and bureaucracy is
fruitless, hypocritical, and incredibly costly. When such "doctrines" are used as cliches, they pro-
vide simple answers in sophisticated clothes.
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order of magnitude as soon as everything to do with goods of adhesion
and documentary contracts of adhesion is viewed in terms of effective
and responsive bureaucracy. Principles become lost in the meandering
corridors of bureaucratic structures. Individual consent loses its sharp,
knowledgeable focus when the consent is to become a consumer-bu-
reaucrat. Democratic consent loses its legitimacy as it forces its way
through complex legislative, administrative, and judicial structures and
emerges unrecognizable at the other side. And even that metaphor is
too generous, because the consent never emerges anywhere, it just
oozes into the private bureaucracies through their almost unrecogniz-
able interfaces with the public bureaucracies. Like everything else cre-
ated by the melding of utilitarianism, pure reason, modern technology,
and modern bureaucratic governance, goods of adhesion and documen-
tary contracts of adhesion are now complex beyond all human capacity
to deal with them.
If this complexity, whether concerning contracts of adhesion or
other aspects of modern life, raises serious problems, the solution is not
to be found in the usual palliatives offered by concerned tinkerers with
the liberal state. But they are also not to be found while accepting the
legitimacy of the bureaucratic consumer-mission as the summum
bonum of society. The solution can only be found in efforts to undo the
unholy mixture just mentioned. Doing that involves sacrifices we are
presently unwilling to make.51 Until we are prepared to make those
sacrifices, we can understand contracts of adhesion, but our legal re-
sponses to them can be no more than limited, and in many respects
unsatisfactory, compromises of both utility and principle.
5i The directions we shall have to go are discussed in Macneil, Bureaucracy, America, and
the Legal Profession, supra note 7.
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